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RIGHT TO BAIL'FOR JUVENILES
The Illinois Juvenile Court Act1 makes no provision for an absolute right
of release from custody on bail.2 It provides:

If the court finds that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity
for the protection of the minor or of the person or property of another that the minor be detained or that he is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court, it may prescribe detention or shelter care and order
that the minor be kept in a suitable place designated by the court;
otherwise it shall release the minor from custody.8
In contrast, the adult criminal defendants have an absolute right of release
except when death is a possible punishment, 4 and factors similar to those above
are important only in determining the amount of bail.5
The purpose of this note is to examine this disparity in the light of current
constitutional trends which have characterized the juvenile process as essentially
criminal where the basis of the preceeding is the violation of a statute which
would result in a criminal prosecution if the juvenile were an adult.0
INTRODUCTION

Until the landmark decision of In re Gaul, 7 the juvenile courts operated
under the laudable presumption that:
[S]ociety's role was not to ascertain whether the child was guilty or
innocent, but [w]hat is he, how he has become what he is, and what
had best be done in his interest and in the interest of the state to save
him from a downward career. s
To this end criminal procedures were inapplicable. In its dealings with the child,
the state was merely occupying the shoes of the real parent. Thus a child had a
right not to liberty but to custody.
The natural parent needs no process to temporarily deprive his child
of its liberty by confining it in his own home, to save it and to shield
it from the consequences of persistence in a career of waywardness,
nor is the state, when compelled, as parens patriae, to take the place
of the father for the same purpose, required to adopt any process as
a means of placing its hands upon the child to lead it into one of its
courts. When the child gets there and the court with the power to save
it, determines on its salvation, and not its punishment, it is immaterial how it got there.9
1 IIl. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1969).
2 Thus it is misleading to state that there is no right to bail. E.g., Feldman, The Prosecutor's Special Tasks in Juvenile Proceedings in Illinois, 59 Ill. Bar J.146, 149 (1970).
3 Iil. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 703-6 (2) (1969).
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 110-4 (a) (1969).
5 fI. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1969).
6 See In the Matter of Samuel Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1
(1967) ; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
7.387 U.S. 1 (1967).
8 Id. at 15.
9 Commonwealth v. Fisher, 213 Pa. 48, 53, 62 A. 198, 200 (1905).
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The juvenile process was characterized as civil,' 0 rather than criminal since
its goals were rehabilitative and beneficient rather than punitive.11 Enlightened
and humanitarian as these goals might have been, the President's Commission
reported in The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society:
The limitations, both in theory and in execution, of strictly rehabilitative treatment methods, combined with public anxiety over the
seemingly irresistible rise in juvenile criminality, have produced a
rupture between the theory and the practice of juvenile court dispositions. While statutes, judges, and commentators still talk the language of compassion and treatment, it has become clear that in fact the
same purposes that characterize the use of the criminal law for adult
offenders-retribution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation-are
involved in the disposition of juvenile offenders too. These are society's
ultimate techniques for protection against threatening conduct; it is
inevitable that they should be used against threats from the young as
well as the old when other resources appear unavailing. 12
If the juvenile system has in fact come to serve the same function as the
criminal system, should the juvenile not be accorded all the same rights and
privileges as adult criminals?
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL

The requirement of collateral before one may be released from custody
serves to insure the presence of the accused at the trial, but also preserves the
presumption of innocence and prevents the infliction of punishment prior to
conviction. 13 The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be
required ... -14 This part of the amendment has never been held applicable to
the states. Whether in federal proceedings the amendment imports an absolute
right to bail or only prohibits excessive bail in those cases where bail has been
otherwise granted at the discretion of the judge or by statutory authority is
unclear. 15 A dearth of definitive cases concerning the right to bail exists. This
situation exists because denial of bail, not being a part of due process, cannot
render a proceeding void unless other factors are involved.' 6 Further impedi10 See, e.g., Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959), for a good summary of
the jurisdictions so holding.
11 Gault, 387 U.S. 1 at 15.
12 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 80 (1967), hereinafter cited as President's
Challenge.
13 Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483, 485 (D.D.C. 1960).
14 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
15 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), where the right to bail was based on a federal
statute, not the eighth amendment. If the eighth amendment doesn't confer an absolute right to
bail, the result would be a limitation on bail not being excessive in those cases where it was
otherwise granted, but such a limitation would have no meaning, for bail could be denied altogether, and this denial would not be termed excessive.
16 See, e.g., Kinney v. Lenon, 425 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1970), where a juvenile who was
denied bail was released because detention interfered with the preparation of his defense, and
would result in an unfair trial; Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967), where dictum was expressed to the effect that a juvenile can test the validity of his detention if essential
treatment is not available or if he is being held in an institution housing adult criminals.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

ments to substantive decisions are that the bail issue may be rendered moot by
a finding of delinquency, 17 and that a denial of bail may be deemed an inter8
locutory order which is not appealable under the Illinois Juvenile Court Act.1
Most pre-Gault decisions have held that no right to bail exists for juveniles 19 because the proceeding is civil not criminal, because the detention is
rehabilitative not punitive, and because as against the state in its capacity as
parens patriaethe child only has a right to custody, not liberty. Gault rejected this
type of reasoning. As a result of Gault, three lower state courts have found that
juveniles have the right to bail.20 However, Chief Judge Bazelon of the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a post-Gault decision, refused to
consider the question of a constitutional right to bail for juveniles since "an
adequate substitute for bail is provided by the District of Columbia Juvenile
Court Act . . . if faithfully observed in practice." 21 The Act provided that the
child shall have a detention hearing and shall not be removed from the custody
of his parents "except when his welfare or the safety and protection of the
public cannot be adequately safeguarded without his removal. '22 Existing provisions were also found adequate in Baldwin v. Lewis, 23 where the statute2 4 was
silent as to any standards for release from custody but where the statute was
construed to provide for release unless "parents or guardian of the juvenile are
incapable under the circumstances to care for him." 25
Inevitably, if this approach were taken in Illinois, existing procedures
would also be found to be an adequate substitute. However, the bail clause of
the Illinois Constitution does not suffer from the same vague language as the
eighth amendment. Article II, Section 7 provides that "[a]ll persons shall be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses, where the proof is
evident or the presumption great .... "26 This section should confer a right to
17 In re Orr, 38 Ill. 2d 417, 231 N.E.2d 424 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 924 (1968).
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-20 (3) (1969).
19 Cinque v. Boyd, 121 A. 678 (Conn. 1923) ; A.N.E. v. State, 156 So. 2d 525 (Fla. App.
1963) ; Ex Parte Cromwell, 232 Md. 305, 192 A.2d 775 (1963) ; Ex Parte Walters, 221 P.2d 659
(Okla. App. 1950) ; Espinosa v. Price, 144 Tex. 121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945). Contra, Trimble
v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960); State v. Franklin, 262 La. 439, 12 So. 2d 211
(1943) ; Ex Parte Osborne, 127 Tex. Crim. 136, 75 S.W.2d 265 (1934), which was distinguished
in Espinosa v. Price, supra.
20 Smith v. McCravy, No. 108809 (Jefferson County Ct., Kentucky, 1967) ; Wisconsin ex
rel Mayberry v. Administrator, (Waukesha County Ct., 1967) ; Wisconsin ex rel Wronski v.
Frohmader, No. 349-590 (Milwaukee Cir. Ct., 1967).
21 Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939,943 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
22 Id.
23 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969).

24 Wis. Stat. sec. 48.29 (1967). A statute providing for bail for juveniles was removed
from the Wisconsin Children's Code in 1956.
25 Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220, 1233 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
26 The provision regarding bail in the Illinois Constitution of 1970, Art. I, Section 9,
remains substantially unchanged. Cf. Ky. Const. § 16 under which bail was granted to juveniles

in Smith v. McCravy, n.20 supra:
All prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient securities, unless for capital offenses when
the proof is evident or presumption great.
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bail if delinquency may be termed an "offense" since all persons accused of
non-criminal "offenses" have a right to bail. A delinquent minor is defined in
the Juvenile Court Act 27 as one who:

[Hias violated or attempted to violate, regardless of where the act
occurred, any federal or state law or municipal ordinance; and (b)
any minor who has violated a lawful court order made under this Act. 28
The term "offense" has been defined as the "transgression of any law ' 2 9 or the
"violation of a law."' 3° These definitions seem to be broad enough to bring
delinquency within the meaning of offense as used in Article II, Section 7.
DENIAL OF BAIL AS VIOLATION OF EQUAL PROTECTION

A right granted to one group may not be withheld from another group
similarly situated, unless a justifiable basis for treating the two groups differently exists with respect to the subject matter of the legislation. 31 The adherents
of the parens patriae doctrine have maintained that this justifiable basis is that
the juvenile process is a civil proceeding designed not to punish but to -rehabilitate and that the adjudication of delinquency is not a conviction. In this
regard the Supreme Court has observed:
The rhetoric of the juvenile court movement has developed without
any necessarily close correspondence to the realities of the court and
institutional routines.3 2
A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found
"delinquent" and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution.
In short the civil-rehabilitative labels can serve as no distinction upon which
juveniles may be denied bail, for both face the loss of liberty no matter what
the process may be called.
Two arguments frequently have been used to justify not granting bail to
juveniles. Some argue that a valid distinction may be made in that money bail
would not insure the juvenile's appearance at the adjudicatory hearing because
he has no property interest in the money put up in his behalf, and has no
4
family responsibilities which would deter him from fleeing the jurisdiction.
Others argue that if bail would be granted, the right to be released would depend
35
solely on the economic status of the parents.
fll. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1969).
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 702.2 (a), (b) (1969).
29 Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. 13, 19 (1852).
so People v. Talbot, 322 IMI.416, 422, 153 N.E. 693, 696 (1926).
31 See Griffin v. Illinois, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
32 387 U.S. at 30.
33 Id at 36.
34 See generally Linklater, Zana, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Juvenile Courts:
Specific Due Process GuaranteesExtended to Accused Delinquents in State Juvenile Court Proceedings, 56 Ill. Bar J. 320, 330 (1967).
85 Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d.939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967). Cf. Black v. United States, 355
F.2d 104, 106 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
27
28
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A property interest of the accused in the collateral is not essential to the
present functioning of the bail system. A complete lack of a property interest
in the collateral exists in those states which have the bond system. In these
states the released person sacrifices his money to the bondsman as a fee for
getting released and appears or does not appear for reasons other than a property interest. In Illinois the bond system has been abolished, but a property
interest in the collateral may still be lacking where a third person, not the released person, deposits the collateral. The juvenile's parent or guardian who
usually post the juvenile's bail would be in a much better position to control
and supervise the juvenile than would the person who posts bail for another
adult.
The juvenile's lack of family responsibilities, if indeed true, should be no
reason for denying bail. The bail system is inconsistent when hardened criminals
and convicted bail-jumpers who are not accused of a capital offense may be admitted to bail, but the juvenile may not be admitted to bail because he may flee
the jurisdiction.
As for release depending on the parent's financial position, the disparity
in wealth among adults, friends, or relatives has never been a reason to deny
adults bail. Why should it be a reason to deny it to juveniles?
Finally, juveniles have the right to bail in Illinois if they are tried by an
adult court by virtue of the juvenile court waiving its jurisdiction over the
juvenile38 or never having jurisdicition in the first place.3 7 The above mentioned
considerations presumably have no application when the juvenile is tried in
an adult court. Should these considerations have any more application in cases
before the juvenile court?
THE IMPLICATIONS OF IN THE MATTER OF SAMUEL WINSHIP

In the Matter of Samuel Winships 8 the Court held that an adjudication of
delinquency must be by the criminal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt,
not by a mere preponderance of the evidence. After finding the criminal standard to have constitutional stature, the Court stated that to afford juveniles the
protection of the standard would not "risk destruction of the beneficial aspects
of the juvenile process" 9 or "compel the States to abandon or displace any
of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." 40 These beneficial aspects
which would not be affected by the Winship holding were enumerated as follows:
[T]hat a finding that a child has violated a criminal law does not constitute a criminal conviction, that such a finding does not deprive the
child of his civil rights, and that juvenile proceedings are confidential.
36 Il1. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 702-7 (3), (5) (1969).
37 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110A, § 553 (d) (1969), which provides for bail for persons under 18
charged with traffic offenses.

38 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
39
40

Id. at 366.
Id. at 367; 387 U.S. at 21.
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Nor will there be any effect on the informality, flexibility, or speed of
the hearing at which the factfinding takes place. And the opportunity
during the post-adjudicatory or dispositional hearing for a wideranging review of the child's social history and for his individualized
treatment will remain unimpaired. Similarly, there will be no effect on
the procedures distinctive to juvenile
proceedings which are employed
41
prior to the adjudicatory hearing.
Likewise, the beneficial aspects of the juvenile process will not be disturbed
by granting juveniles in Illinois the right to bail. Granting juveniles the right to
bail will in no way alter the practice of the juvenile court to look to the treatment, reformation and rehabilitation of the child, and will not serve to impose
a sort of punishment on him which could be construed as criminal punishment.
Indeed, detention without bail would be more punitive, and might stigmatize
the child even before he was adjudicated a delinquent. 42 Bail would have no
effect on the child's subsequent right to hold a position of trust, for this right
depends on whether the court decides to release information regarding the
child's appearance before the court. 48 Confidentiality pending the adjudicatory
hearing would be increased since the child released on bail could continue his
education without having to explain his absences from school.4 4 Granting bail
would not encumber the juvenile process, for the decision to grant bail could be
incorporated into an already existing procedure-the detention hearing. 45 The release of the juvenile on bail would unclog the courts' calendars. If the child
is detained, he must have an adjudicatory hearing within 10 days; whereas if he
46
is released, the hearing may be held within 30 days.
Presently in Illinois, the burden of showing that certain factors exist which
warrant the detention of the child is on the prosecution. 47 If the bail were to be
granted as a right, the burden of proof might come to rest on the child. That is,
the burden might devolve upon the child to show that he should be released
without bail or for a lesser amount. If this result were to occur, the effect would
41

397 U.S. 358, 366, 367 (1970).

If the juvenile is innocent, his detention would be viewed as unfair, and would instill a
sense of hostility and bitterness in the child. See also Studt, The Client's Image of the Juvenile
Court, in Justice for the Child 200, 211-214 (M. Rosenheim ed. 1962) to the effect that detention would not only have an effect on the child, but also on the parent. The court's arbitrariness
in denying bail may be viewed by the parent as a usurpation of the parental function indicating
self-worthlessness. They cease performing their guidance duties adequately, and their children
consequently lose respect for them. As a result, parents perform even more inadequately because
of further loss of esteem. This vicious circle effectively obliterates the potentially valuable contribution the parents can make to treatment.
43 See generally Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 702-9 (1969).
44 See Steigman, Detention Hearing, in Illinois Juvenile Practice 3-1, 3-17, 18 (Illinois
Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1971), to the effect that detention may be disruptive
of schooling forcing forfeiture of an entire semester's work, or causing the juvenile to believe
that the only course available to him is to drop out.
45 See generally Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 703-6 (1969).
4 111. Rev. Stat. ch. § 704-2 (1969). See also Steigman, Detention Hearing, in Illinois
Juvenile Practice 3-1, 3-17, 18 (Illinois Institute for Continuing Legal Education 1971), to the
effect that detention centers are overcrowded and inadequately supervised, so that the child
may be forced to associate with hardened criminals and submit to deviate sexual assaults.
47 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1969).
42
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be that those who are now released reluctantly into the custody of their parents
might be required to post a minimal amount of bail. To avoid the possibility and
to secure for the child the best of both worlds, 48 the present practice of releasing
the child, unless one of the factors warranting detention is found to exist, should
be continued. When one of these factors is found however, the right to be released on bail should attach. The effect of this procedure would be that those who
are presently released would continue to be released and those that are presently
detained would have the right to bail.
Some reason exists to believe that detention has been the rule rather than
the exception although stated policy is directly contrary to this proposition.4 9
The President's Commission has observed:
Detention appears to be far too routinely and frequently used for
juveniles both while they are awaiting court appearances and during
the period after disposition and before institution space is available.
In theory a juvenile is detained only when no suitable custodian can
be found or when there appears to be a substantial risk that he will get
into more trouble or hurt himself or someone else before he can be
taken to court. A study for the Commission found, however, that in
1965 two-thirds of all juveniles apprehended were admitted to detention facilities and held there an average of 12 days. 50
One explanation of this phenomenon is that detention without the right of
bail is used as a "shock treatment" rather than as protection of the child or the
community. 51 This conclusion seems to find support in the growing number of
cases where the findings of the trial court were found to be insufficient to warrant
detention. 52 If juveniles were given the right to bail 53 the present abuses might
be answered by withdrawing from the court the absolute right to detain.
48 Cf. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) ; "There is evidence, in fact, that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets
neither the protection accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children."
49 Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 37, § 701-2 (1) (1969).
50 President's Challenge, 87 (1967).
51 See Task Force Report: Juvenile Delinquency and Youth Crime, President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 13 (1967).
52 Baldwin v. Lewis, 300 F. Supp. 1220 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d
939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); In re M., 89 Cal. Rptr. 33, 473 P.2d 737 (1970) where at 747, n.24
the court pointed out factors which are not relevant to the decision of whether the child
should be detained:
(1) Public outcry against the offense allegedly committed by the minor;
(2) The need to crack down generally on juveniles in the area;
(3) The nature of the offense per se;
(4) The belief that detention would have a salutary effect on the minor (the juvenile

court does not have the right to exercise its jurisdiction over a minor for this
purpose, if at all, until the adjudication of wardship or dependency has been
made) ;
(5) Convenience of the police, the probation officer, or the district attorney for investigation purposes;
(6) Concern that the minor will fabricate a defense to his case;
(7) Inability of the minor to show good cause why he should be released;
and In re Macidon, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861 (1966).
58 In England bail is acknowledged as of right to children pending their hearings. Henriques, Children's Courts in England, 37 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 295, 296 (1946).
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CONCLUSION

With the failure of the juvenile court movement in its non-punitive approach and with the characterization of the juvenile process as criminal for
certain purposes, a consideration of the total rights of the juvenile is needed. If
the end result of the juvenile process is possible loss of liberty, should the
juvenile's rights be any more limited than those of adults?
Although the eighth amendment of the federal Constitution has never been
held by the United States Supreme Court to confer an absolute right to bail in
the state or federal proceedings, to view the amendment as only a limitation on
excessive bail and to permit bail to be denied altogether seems to change the
meaning of the amendment.
Under the Illinois Constitution there is ample ground for conferring a
right to bail on juveniles. The denial of bail to juveniles, but not to adults,
may constitute a violation of equal protection. To detain juveniles without bail
is in effect to put them in the same category, for purposes of bail, as adults accused of murder against whom there is strong evidence.
The right to bail for juveniles in Illinois would seem to have no destructive
effect on the unique benefits of the juvenile system which testify to its worthiness
and probably justify its retention.
Some evidence exists that detention without bail has been used as shock
treatment and not for the avowed purposes of protecting the community or the
child. One way of curbing these abuses would be to grant juveniles the right
to bail.
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